Banks use internal models to optimize risk weights and better account for the specific risk of each asset class. As the choice of a set of risk weights directly amounts to affecting the regulatory capital ratio, economic theory suggests that banks should optimize their risk weights also with respect to the cost and benefit of holding equity capital. Banks with a higher cost of capital, and banks with better growth opportunities, should be more aggressive in reducing risk weights. We consider a large panel of international banks and find that, after controlling for a number of bank and country characteristics, banks do respond to the cost and benefit of holding capital when selecting their average risk weights. We also find that banks that are more aggressive in terms of such optimization have a subsequent lower return on equity and are more likely to have raised capital during the credit crisis.
Introduction 1
Regulators have recently pushed for better capitalized international banks, especially after the credit crisis. As a result, banks like to show capital strength, particularly from the point of view of regulatory capital. Economic theory offers conflicting predictions about the relation between bank capital and value. In the standard Modigliani-Miller world there is no relation between the two, but agency costs may produce a negative relation, see e.g. Stulz (1990) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) . However, Mehran and Thakor (2010) claims there is a positive relation between capital and value, and Allen et al. (2011) show that banks may use costly capital to commit to asset monitoring.
Risk-based capital regulation sets a minimum ratio between capital and risk-weighted assets.
In the original version of the Basel regulation, so called Basel I, weights are imposed externally by the regulator. By definition, the resulting capital ratio cannot account for cross-bank heterogeneity and country characteristics. In the Basel II regulation, banks are given the possibility to choose their own weights by means of internal risk models, subject to a positive judgment on the part of national regulation authorities. Internal models should define weights purely on risk measurement considerations, i.e. the internal weights should be set to the level that best reflects the intrinsic riskiness of a given asset. However, it is well known that, especially due to tax reasons, equity capital is the most expensive source of financing for banks. This opens the possibility that banks set their risk weights with the purpose of reducing the quantity of capital that is needed to support a given level and structure of total assets (so called risk weight optimization). A favourable set of weights would reduce the total amount of risk-weighted assets (RWA), making existing (equity and hybrid) capital more likely to comply with a regulation that is set in terms of the ratio between capital and RWA.
We expect that the higher the cost of equity capital, the more serious the efforts of banks to optimize risk weights. As data on weights are not publicly available, in most of our empirical work 1 The opinions expressed here are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of the affiliated Institutions.
we proxy risk weights with the ratio between RWA and total assets (so called density). We use panel data on a sample of large international banks to test whether the cost of equity capital is relevant to affect the density. While the null hypothesis is that the cost of equity has no effects on the density, our alternative hypothesis is that there is an inverse relation between the cost of equity and the density.
There are several reasons why this question is relevant. First, banks should not let the cost of equity capital drive the density to a level that does not properly account for risk. The density should be set at a level that is right for the true risk associated with the bank, in such a way as to achieve a level of equity capital that allows banks to be safe with respect to negative shocks. Evidence showing that the cost of equity affects the density raises the possibility that banks artificially inflate their capital ratios. Second, if density depends on the cost of equity capital, then there is a possibility that the playing field is not level at all, both nationally and internationally. As the eurocrisis has shown, there are well known effects of country characteristics on the public cost of funding, that pass through at the bank level as the cost of equity capital depends on long term government rates. Any heterogeneity in the cost of public funding across countries then translates into heterogeneity in the cost of equity capital for banks belonging to different countries, and this in turn affects the density. Unfortunately the final impact would go the wrong way: banks located in countries with a higher cost of funding would optimize their RWA to a larger extent, artificially inflating their capital ratios and ending up as less resilient to external shocks. The implication is that two banks with similar total assets and asset structures and that are similar in all characteristics except in their domestic country would have the same capital ratio but different ratios between equity and assets, with the bank located in the riskier country showing a higher leverage.
There is a growing literature on RWA, largely based on descriptive analyses. Using available Pillar III information, Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (2011) argues that there are large differences in risk weights across European banks, with weights on residential mortgages ranging from 6% to 30% and corporate risk weights going from 27% to 85%. Cannata, Casellina and Guidi (2012) focuses on credit risk and shows that a large part of interbank dispersion across Italian banks is explained by the business models and by the use of internal-rating based (IRB) approach versus the Standardised approach. Mediobanca (2012) studies 25 European banks and claims that the loanbook mix and different business models hardly explain the key differences in asset intensity, that are instead mainly due to the different mix between IRB and Standardised. Barclays (2012) documents the existence of bank-level large temporal variations across time for most banks in its sample. Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) look at a sample of 50 systemically important banks from Asia Pacific, Europe and North America, documenting wide international heterogeneities in densities, with a negative trend over the recent period that may have been due to factors like the progressive application of internal models, changes in business mix, the business cycle. They show that RWA densities of European banks tend to be lower than those of Asian and North American banks and that retail banks tend to have higher densities than universal banks and investment banks.
They also notice that the characteristics of banks' portfolios are important determinants of RWAs. Das and Sy (2012) Our paper differs from this literature. First, we do not simply describe differences across banks but use economic theory to formulate hypotheses that are tested on the basis of econometric models. We try to better understand the meaning of risk weight optimization and highlight a key element, the cost of equity capital, that could drive it. Second, our sample, represented by an unbalanced panel data of 548 banks from 45 countries over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , is much larger than the ones considered in other papers, and can reveal differences across banks and across time, using the signals arising from several world countries that differ significantly in terms of economic and institutional environments. Third, our econometric methodology looks at a wide variety of estimation models, including a GMM estimation in a dynamic panel framework to account for endogeneity. Fourth, we consider a wide range of bank and country characteristics that have been highlighted by researchers as potential drivers of heterogeneity in risk weights. Fifth, we also collect information for a large subset of 86 banks reporting the share of exposure at default (EAD) subject to internal rating models in their Pillar III annual reports (for the year 2008-2011) and produce Tobit estimation where the dependent variable is the percentage of credit EAD examined by banks by means of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA).
Our empirical analysis shows that the cost of equity capital is indeed a significant factor in explaining RWA optimization on the part of banks: the larger the cost of capital the lower the RWA density. We also find that the better are growth opportunities the more intense is risk weight optimization, as banks try to build up excess capital that may be used to finance future growth.
Other factors work as expected: more traditional business models are characterized by higher risk weights, larger banks optimize more strongly, expected default frequency of the corporate sector is associated with larger risk weights, banks located in countries with better creditor rights also show larger risk weights. Most of the results are robust to using as a dependent variable the ratio between risk-weighted assets and assets or the share of credit exposure described by internal models. In an attempt to understand the general implications of this optimization activity, we find that banks that are characterized by more intense optimization have lower return on equity and have raised more capital during the credit crisis.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes RWA optimization and discusses the main hypotheses to be tested in the empirical work; section 3 describes the data, section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, based on both a static panel methodology and a dynamic GMM system. Section 5 presents robustness and further insights about the consequence of RWA optimization, while section 6 concludes.
RWA density optimization
Banks face a capital dilemma. From the stability perspective, they need to have as high a capital as possible to be able to absorb losses (and thus increase the distance to default). However, from the performance perspective, they also need to realize an acceptable rate of return on capital, that can be more easily achieved through leverage and the reduction of the ratio between equity capital and total assets. In order to prevent managers to pursue excessive leverage, and the associated level of risk, regulators set a minimum ratio between capital and risk-weighted assets 2 .
Under the Basel II approach, regulators leave some flexibility in the determination of risk-weighted assets through the so-called internal risk-based models. Under the internal ratings-based approach banks can classify their assets in a relatively large number of asset classes. The probability of default (PD) is estimated by the bank, whereas the other relevant parameters like the loss given default (LGD), exposure-at-default (EAD) and maturity (M) can be provided by the regulator itself Flexibility also amounts to partially allowing managers to choose how to meet their own capital requirements: by reducing weights applied to assets, they can increase the current ratio between capital and RWA. This opens the way to RWA optimization. The bright side of such optimization is the possibility to better tune the capital needs to the actual risks run by the banks.
The dark side is the selection of a level of capital that may be low with respect to the actual risks. A bank that is short of regulatory capital may reduce risk weights and become compliant even without raising new capital. As a result of risk weight optimization, leverage would be higher than the level that would have been associated with a capital increase. RWA optimization is therefore potentially 2 There is a broad literature, largely associated with the 2008 credit crisis, suggesting that regulation should look at the ratio between capital and assets as well as the actual amount of capital in order to force banks to respect the minimum levels through capital accumulation rather than asset disposure. See Admati and Hellwig (2013) for a general discussion. 3 Under the Standardised Approach risk weights depend on the external ratings; the number of risk buckets is small; for past-due loans some degree of discretion can be exercised by national authorities in reducing the risk weight according to the degree of provisioning of each loan.
linked with capital optimization and regulatory capital reduction. Our hypothesis is that a higher cost of equity capital can induce banks to increase leverage and therefore to decrease risk weights.
A host of other bank-specific and environmental factors, partly highlighted by the existing literature, may also affect this optimization process. In what follows, we describe the variables that may affect the RWA density and the variables that may drive the optimization process. The first two hypotheses are the core of our paper and testing. The remaining five hypotheses include variables, some of which have already been discussed in the literature, that have clear implications on the RWA density. Finally, we discuss creditor rights and claim that it may have a theoretical unclear impact on the density.
Hypothesis 1:
The higher the cost of equity capital the lower the RWA density.
From a cross sectional point of view, banks with a larger cost of equity capital will optimize more. The larger cost of equity capital may be due to a higher systematic risk and/or to country factors, like a higher long-term interest rate.
Hypothesis 2: The higher are growth opportunities the lower the RWA density.
The relation between expected returns on equity and RWA is affected by growth opportunities that may require capital as well as external funds. If bank managers foresee good profit opportunities they will try to reduce RWA density in order to have a capital buffer that may support more lending.
Hypothesis 3:
The larger the size of the bank the lower the RWA density.
The implementation of Basel II, and the connected development of internal rating based models to a wide range of risks and counterparts, has provided flexibility in the assessment of RWA. This flexibility may however be achieved only by investing a substantial amount of resources in the development of a large and skilled risk management team. The bank's decision to move from a standardized to an IRB approach implies a relevant investment which is more easily undertaken by larger institutions. (see Hakens and Schnabel (2011) for a theoretical approach on this issue).
Hypothesis 4: Traditional and retail-oriented business models are characterized by higher RWA density.
Since loans carry large risk weights, banks' portfolio composition may strongly affect the density. There are assets, such as national government bonds, that do not consume economic capital (see Cannata et al 2012) while retail activity is more likely to have higher risk weights with huge differences across countries.
Hypothesis 5: IFRS-based accounting is characterized by lower RWA density.
Accounting standard differences introduce a bias in the way total assets are computed as the netting of derivatives positions is authorized under US GAAP and not allowed under IFRS.
Thus the off-balance sheet positions would appear "larger" on an IFRS basis. IFRS implementation is empirically associated to higher total adjusted assets and consequently to lower RWA density, see Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) .
Hypothesis 6: The stricter the supervisory control, the larger the RWA density.
Strict supervisory controls may determine prudent behaviour from the management and a higher RWA density. Basel II recognizes an important role to supervision in risk assessment as approval and validation of IRB models is a key element of the new capital regime. The positive relation can also be due to the evidence that regulatory restrictions increase bank taking incentives and thus the investment in risky assets (Gonzales,2005) .
Hypothesis 7: the higher the borrowers' risk, the larger RWA density.
An increase in the average default probability of borrowers implies a revision of bank's PD and thus higher RWA. This represents the potential procyclicality caveat of the Basel Capital Accord. So long as rating systems are responsive to changes in borrower default risk, risk weighted assets will increase and consequently capital requirements will tend to increase as an economy falls into recession and fall as an economy enters an expansion. (Catarineu-Rabell et al. 2005) .
Hypothesis 8: the index of Creditor Protection has an uncertain impact of the RWA density.
Stronger creditor rights are associated with increased lending to a wider and potentially riskier set of borrowers, see Djankov et al. (2007) , higher bank risk taking, as shown empirically by Houston et al. (2010) , and by lower corporate risk taking, as shown by Acharya et al. (2009) . The latter is due to risk aversion on the part of the management that tries to decrease the probability of distress and may also try to a decrease in the demand for bank credit. The final impact of creditor rights on the RWA density depends therefore on which channel is stronger.
Data
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel data set of 548 banks from 45 countries over the period 2005-2011 (see the Appendix A for the list of countries and the number of banks per country). The availability of bank specific and country specific variables leads to a sample of around 1,000 bank-year observations. A cross-country study is appropriate because variation in RWA density across countries is likely to be greater than cross-bank variation within countries.
Our dependent variable is the ratio between risk weighted asset and total asset (RWTA) 4 .
The banks included in our sample have total assets larger than USD 1 billion as of 2010 and must have data on risk weighted assets for at least five years 5 .
[Insert figure1 around here] The t test of the mean difference for the two subsamples rejects the null of equality of means at any probability level. Basel II seems to be a relevant factor in driving the decisions of banks to select the RWTA, even though it may only be a proxy for other variables.
[Insert table 1 around here]
In our regressions we consider several variables, both at bank and at the country level, to minimize the risk of attributing density differences to observable elements of cross-bank heterogeneity like those discussed in the literature, see e.g. Cannata et al. (2012, Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) . The main data source for bank's characteristics are Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope and bank's annual reports. All financial variables are converted into US dollar.
[Insert table 2 around here] Summary statistics of bank-level variables are reported in Table 2 , panel A. All the variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles of their distribution to reduce the influence of outliers and potential data errors. Approximately half of the banks in the sample adopt an IFRS accounting standard, and more than 60% follow the Basel II regulation. The average annual increase in the loan to asset ratio is only 0.4%, coherently with the slow-down in economic activity associated with the credit crisis. The average price-to-book ratio is 1.17 with a median close to 1.
The average ratio between net interest income and total assets (net interest margin, taken as a proxy of the business model) is 3%. The median beta (measured from a market model regression for each bank with respect to the correspondent local equity index described in Appendix A) is close to 1 with a substantial standard deviation; such heterogeneity is welcome as our main hypothesis is about the relation between the cost of capital and the RWA density. The ratio between equity and total assets is 8.34% but goes down to 7.19% when tangible equity is considered. The average return on equity is 7.14% with a median of 10.17% and a large standard deviation due to observations with low or negative return on equity. Impaired loans are on average 4.37% of gross loans. The average tier one ratio is 12.22%. The natural logarithm of the z-score, which indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank's rate of return on asset has to fall before it becomes insolvent see Laeven and Levine (2009) , is equal to 3 on average. Average total assets for the banks adopting the Basle 2 regime is equal to USD 176 bn. 
Empirical analysis
We consider both a static approach and a dynamic approach. The static approach models the level of the density at each point in time on the basis of variables that are determined in previous periods. The dynamic approach includes the lagged level of the density in the specification and looks at the contemporaneous impact of the variables on the current density. Both approaches may be justified by both the characteristics of the sample of data and the economic theory behind the specification.
A static approach
In our static approach we explain the RWA density of bank i belonging to country j at time t on the basis of variables determined at time t-1
CC is the cost of capital, that we proxy with the beta of the bank (measured in the previous year to avoid endogeneity problems) and the long term interest on government bonds. Notice that our measure of the cost of capital is time-varying. RC is the benefit of holding capital proxied by the price to book ratio. The previous two variables represent the main interest of our estimation.
BM represents the business model of the bank, that we proxy with the net interest margin.
This measure accounts for the difference between traditional relationship banking and transaction oriented activities, see also Demiurguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011). We expect this coefficient to be positive because regulation implies higher risk weights for commercial banking activities that cannot be completely unwind by the application of internal models. 6 CE represents proxies for environmental factors. There are two effects here, one relevant at the static level when comparing banks located in different countries, and one relevant at the dynamic level within each country. At the static level, different countries are heterogeneous regarding (fixed or slowly changing) institutions, laws and accounting standards that affect contracts and creditors rights. At the dynamic level, risk may increase in a country because of a specific policy shock so that banks using internal models may be forced to update their PDs to account for an increased level of defaults. Moreover a country could have a more oscillating cycle (e.g. the USA) while another country (e.g. a European country) may have less volatility (compensated by lower average growth) due to differences in labour market flexibility, role of the State , degrees of protection of creditors and investors.
In terms of proxies, we alternatively use fixed country effects and a number of proxy variables (see description in Appendix B). The variables that we identify are the following. The first is the expected default frequency of the corporate sector (EDF), that may proxy for general riskiness of the lending environment. The second is the index of official power (OFF) to measure the impact of regulation. The third is a dummy that is equal to one when the country has signed up to Basel II (BAS). The accounting standard is represented by a dummy that describes the use of local GAAP or IFRS. Finally, to measure the institutional environment we use the index of creditor rights from La Porta et al. (1998) that assembles information on reorganization and liquidation procedures, see Appendix B for its description. We alternatively use four other indexes. The first is a dummy equal to one when the legal origin is represented by the common law, that usually is associated with a higher loan to asset ratio and a higher degree of legal rights protection (Cole and Turk Ariss 2011).
La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 , find that legal origin explains much of the cross-country variation in legal protection of investors. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) and Djankov et al (2007) establish that credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP is higher in countries of British legal origin. The second is the strength of legal rights, measuring the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws, obtained from the World Bank Doing Business Indicator. The third is the index of Financial Freedom, also used by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2009) , that measures the openness of the financial system by looking mainly at the relevance of the public sector and its involvement in the allocation of credit. 7 The fourth is the recovery rate which is inversely related to the LGD. Recovery procedures, usually considered bank-specific, are strongly affected by national practices. These factors play a role in the risk management decisions as different recovery track records are associated with different risk weights and can modify bank officers' risk aversion.
Pairwise correlations between bank-level variables (Panel A of Table 3 ) and country variables (Panel B of Table 3 ) are generally small.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The results for panel regressions with fixed effects (year and country) and lagged bank-level variables are shown in table 4.
[Insert Table 4 around here ]
Column 1 presents the basic specification; bank's control variables are added in turn in the remaining columns. The results confirm most of our hypotheses. Beta is not significant, but the interaction between beta and the Basle dummy is negative and significant in all specifications. To judge the economic significance of this coefficient, a two standard deviation increase in the interaction BETA*BAS is associated with a reduction in the density of 5.4% that corresponds to a RWA saving of approximately USD 5 bn on average. The interpretation is that high-beta banks working in the Basle II framework have a lower RWTA, consistent with the hypothesis that stronger incentives to save capital lead to more optimization whenever this is allowed by regulation.
Interestingly, the Basle II dummy variable by itself is not statistically significant. The price-tobook 8 has a negative coefficient: growth opportunities require banks to increase assets; in order to avoid raising capital, banks may decide to optimize risk weights more aggressively. 7 The index has been used to proxy for risk-taking on the part of banks, but Gonzales (2005) has shown that its relation with risk-taking is empirically ambiguous. 8 We also try the interaction between the variable representing the benefit of capital and the dummy representing the jurisdictions adopting Basle2. Given the lack of statistical significance and the lack of space we do not report the correspondent specification in table4 but results are available upon request to the authors..
The net income margin is positive, confirming that traditional banking activity is associated to higher risk weights. The accounting dummy is negative, as expected. We also control for other bank level variables: the log of total assets, ratio between equity and total assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans, the log of the Z-score. The log of total assets is always significantly negative, as big banks use their risk departments to develop internal rating models. The adoption of the IRB approach requires the construction and maintenance of large internal databases, the acquisition of expertise necessary to build rating systems for each class of counterparts comparable to those available from recognized external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) and several accurate validation procedures by the national supervisory body. The ratio of the book value of equity to total assets 9 is used to evaluate the incentive stemming from the level of capitalization.
Given the regulators focus on adequate capital ratios we assume that banks with high level of capital may have less motivation to pursue RWA optimization policies. Table 4 provides support to our interpretation. The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, in principle, should boost the stock of risk weighted assets as it worsens the risk profile of the loan portfolio. Finally, we control for the idiosyncratic risk by including the log of the z-score. Interestingly, the last two control variables exert no significant impact on the RWTA density.
An alternative way to account for country-specific effects is to introduce country level variables into equation (1).
[Insert Table 5 around here]
The basic results regarding bank characteristics are unaffected by the introduction of country specific variables, except for the significance of the accounting standard (A) and of the beta coefficient (BETA). As to the cost of capital, the overall effect (the sum of the coefficients of BETA and BETA*BAS) remains negative for banks belonging to jurisdictions adopting the Basle 2 framework. The positive relation between BETA and the density for banks not belonging to Basle II 9 Alternatively we tried the ratio of tangible equity to total assets, with no difference in results. In the tables we kept the EQTA ratio simply to avoid the loss of observations due to a larger number of missing value associated to goodwill and other intangibles.
may be due to the impact of systematic risk. The lack of such a relation in the previous specification may have been due to the presence of fixed country effects absorbing the impact of BETA. Among the country level variables the average Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of the national corporate sector and the degree of official monitoring are significant and of the expected sign, as higher environmental risk forces the banks to maintain higher risk weights and more severe regulators prevent banks from over-optimizing. Creditor rights is positive and significant only when the variable Legal rights is also included in the regression (it appears with a negative sign). We have already pointed out that their sign could be either negative or positive depending on the relative strength of demand and supply channels. As to other proxies of the institutional setting, the recovery rate is negative and significant while the index of Common Law and the index of Financial
Freedom are not significantly different from zero.
The dynamic model: the system GMM approach
To allow for potential autocorrelation in RWA's we estimate a dynamic version of (1): Difference GMM estimator of equation (2) as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is based upon the following orthogonality conditions:
10 We can rewrite (2) as are used as instruments for the residual of equation (2) in differences. However this estimator suffers from potentially small sample bias when the number of time periods is small and the dependent variable is persistent, see Alonso -Borrego and Arellano (1999). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest the use of System Generalized Method of Moment (System GMM) that bypasses the finite sample bias if one assumes mild stationarity on the initial conditions of the underlying data generation process. This method seems appropriate also for a number of reasons: (i) it controls for the possible problem of reverse causality of many of the explicative variables used in the specification, (ii) it does not require a distributional assumption on the error term, (iii) it is suitable for a relatively large number of crosssection observations compared to time series observations. In addition to the moment conditions specified in equation (3) system GMM uses the following moment conditions:
We use lagged first differences of the dependent variable to construct the orthogonality conditions for the error term of equation (3) Table 6 reports one -step system GMM estimates of equation (2) 12 :
[Insert Table 6 around here ]
11 All GMM estimations are carried out using the xtabond2 package in Stata (see Roodman 2009) 12 Technically, the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient. However Monte Carlo studies have shown that the efficiency gain is typically small, and that the two-step GMM estimator has the disadvantage of converging to its asymptotic distribution relatively slowly. In finite samples, the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be seriously biased downwards, and thus form an unreliable guide for inference (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 2001).
We report three main tests to determine the appropriateness of our dynamic GMM estimations. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the errors, with a null hypothesis represented by no autocorrelation in differenced residuals (more specifically, the second-order test in first differences for autocorrelation in levels). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions with the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the instruments are valid. A further test is the Diff-in-Hansen test for the validity of the additional moment restrictions necessary for system GMM given in equation (4). In all cases the Arellano-
Bond test for zero autocorrelation shows that at order 2 there is no evidence of serial correlation and the p-values of the Hansen tests do not reject the null hypothesis. In summary our test statistics hint at a proper specification. Table 6 reports six regressions of the RWA density. Regressions 2-6 differs from regression 1 in that they include a set of country variables. In all regressions, the bank level variables enter with the expected sign when significant. Differently from the results in table 4 but in line with those of table 5 we find that the variable associated with the cost of capital is significant (at least at 5% level) and positive. Again, the coefficient of beta is smaller than the negative coefficient of the interaction between Beta and Basle II, but the composite effect seems small. Contrary to results presented in table 5, the dummy variable Basle II (here treated as purely exogenous) is positive and statistically significant. Finally, the estimates confirm the relevance of the selected country-level variables. In particular, EDF, Official and Creditor rights show a positive impact on the RWA density. Moreover, the proxies for risk taking, whose signs are theoretically ambiguous, turn out to be significant and positive, suggesting that more advanced institutional frameworks lead to lower degrees of risk aversion of bank's managers. Changes in sign and significance for some of the regressors are not uncommon when moving from a static to a dynamic approach (see Soto 2010) and this could be due to the fact that panel OLS does not account for persistence of the data generation process. Table 7 presents the parameter estimates obtained substituting PB with two alternative measures of business opportunities, the return on average equity (ROAE) -column (1) and (2)-and the future growth of loans DLOTAF, in columns (3) and (4).
Robustness and further insights

Robustness
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Ordinary panel data analysis cannot cope with the endogeneity problem due to the use of the future value of the percentage change of gross loans, thus we implement a panel IV GMM regression, where the instruments are the first two lags 13 of the same variable. Column (1) and (3) show specifications without control variables which are instead accounted for in column (2) incentive for banks are usually higher as their markets become more concentrated (e.g. Boyd et al. 2005 ). None of these variables is significant when added to our model and our main results are not affected.
Internal Rating Models and RWA
As part of the robustness analysis, in this section we study the relation between bank characteristics and internal risk models for a subset of banks in our sample. Here we focus on the percentage of credit EAD modelled by banks through internal models (we call such a variable IRBA). IRBA has two advantages: first it is a direct result of the efforts of banks to use internal models and second it is limited to credit risk and does not also include other sources of risk (e.g. market risk and operational risk) that may affect the density. We are able to measure the variable from the Pillar III reports of 86 international banks located in countries adopting Basle II.
[Insert Table 8 share of EAD evaluated with internal rating models is associated with a lower RWA density. All the remaining variables keep the statistical significance and sign as in the previous analyses. The same idea may be applied to derive a proxy for each bank-year observation (BETA OPT) which represents the reduction of RWTA due to optimization (high degrees of optimization corresponding to large positive values).
RWA optimization and banks' resilience
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Panel A in Table 9 shows the estimates of a panel OLS where the dependent variable (ROAE) is regressed against BETA OPT and other control variables. In all cases, over the full sample and during times of crisis, the RWA optimization produces a negative effect on bank's performance. This result could be due to a biased valuation of risks that alters the profitability prospects and is robust to the introduction of bank's level control variables, including the cost of capital BETA (see equation 3 in Table 9 ). This finding is preliminary but holds true also when we consider as dependent variable the ratio between net income and total assets 19 . Despite the need for further analyses, this suggests that risk weight optimization have a null short run impact of profitability.
In 
Conclusions
We show that the cost of equity capital is a relevant factor in risk weights optimization. This holds under several econometric specifications, and considering several bank and country characteristics that are believed to represent objective sources of heterogeneity in the choice of risk weights. Our findings open the possibility that the international playing field is not level which may be an unintended consequence of the flexibility allowed by regulators to use the large information sets locally available to banks in order to better determine their risks. Moreover, it also raises the question of whether stock market investors understand the result of this optimization process. If the 19 Estimates are not reported here for parsimony but are available upon request to the authors. 20 The margins are the estimates of the marginal probability effects of the explanatory variables .
available public information does not allow them to understand it, then questions should be raised about the effectiveness of the current disclosure arrangements. On the other hand, if investors do account for different risk weights, then stock prices may incorporate the possibility that bank capital
is less than what one would deduce from the official tier one ratio. This would imply that studies regarding capital in banking would better use a measure of tangible equity rather than the tier one ratio.
The ultimate impact of the risk weighting system on banks and the economy at large is a fascinating topic. The risk weighting system may well affect business choices of banks, for example by inducing them to over-invest in low-risk weight assets like real estate and government debt. If there are macroeconomic crises associated with the emergence of unforeseen risks in the assets the banks have over-invested into, then there is potentially negative relation between indicators of risk that are set by the regulators and the riskiness of banks. This negative relation could be due to errors in determining risk weights, e.g. regulators suffering from behavioural biases and not looking at the long run experience revealed by the data, and/or new risks exogenously appearing in ways that are unrelated to historical experience, and/or to an endogenous mechanism by which low risk weights allow excess capital to flow into a sector and as a consequence relax discipline among agents in that sector and finally build up risks. In this paper we do not consider such links and limit ourselves to understanding whether the system may have unintended consequences on the management of banks. We raise the possibility that RWA optimization may be bad for profits and may induce banks to work with too little capital in normal times and may force banks to raise capital in bad times. However, these results are only suggestive of further studies that should see RWA optimization as part of a bigger picture that also looks at macroeconomic instability.
Appendix B: Variables definition and data sources
This LGZ Z score computed as the average bank return on asset plus bank equity to assets ratio scaled by the standard deviation of return on assets over a five-year rolling window. Higher z score indicate lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of zscore because its distribution is highly skewed (in percentage)
Our computation on Bankscope raw data LTA Natural log of total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data LOTA Total bank's loan to bank's total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data NIM Net interest margin the ratio of the difference between the total interest income and cost of -interest expenses related to -the funds used for making loans and investments on the average interest bearing assets
Our computation on Bankscope raw data P/B Bank's price to book value Bankscope ROAE Average return on equity (in percentage) Bankscope TEQTA Tangible equity (total equity-goodwill) to total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data T1RATIO Bank's core capital to total risk weighted assets Bankscope PANEL B
CREDITOR RIGHTS
An index aggregating creditor rights. It ranges between 0 and 4 over the period of . It is the sum of the four indexes that follow: restrictions on reorganization that equals 1 if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions and 0 otherwise; no automatic stay that equals 1 if there is no imposition of an La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny(1998), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer(2007) automatic stay on the assets upon filing the petition and creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition is approved and 0 otherwise; secured creditor paid first that equals 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds of a bankruptcy as opposed to other creditors 0 otherwise; no management stay that equals 1 if an official appointed by the court or by the creditors, is responsible for the operation of the business during reorganization and 0 otherwise COMMON LAW Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the country has common law as legal origin 
